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STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AFTER PENNSYLVANIA
V. UNION GAS CO.: THE DEMISE OF THE ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prose-
cuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.'
Since its ratification in 1798, the eleventh amendment has
sheltered wrongful states from citizen suits in federal court.
Interpreted literally, the amendment denies federal court juris-
diction only in diversity suits, those suits "against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.' 2 In Hans v. Louisiana,3 decided
nearly a century after the ratification of the eleventh amendment,
the United States Supreme Court extended eleventh amendment
state immunity to citizen suits in federal court in which jurisdic-
tion is premised upon the presence of a federal question. 4 Rather
than limit state immunity to suits clearly articulated in the
amendment, the Court broadly interpreted the general principle
of state sovereign immunity as reflected in the eleventh amend-
ment to protect states from suits in federal court brought by
citizens of any state.5
Although the Court in Hans recognized the principle of state
sovereign immunity without exception, throughout the past cen-
tury the Court has restricted the states' ability to shield them-
selves behind the eleventh amendment.6 In so d6ing, the Court
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XL
2. Id.
3. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
4. See id. at 15-18.
5. Justice Bradley ridiculed the proposition that the eleventh amendments extension
of state immunity only from suits brought by noncitizens rendered a suit against a state
brought by one of its own citizens constitutionally permissible:
Suppose that Congress, when proposing the Eleventh Amendment, had
appended to it a proviso that nothing therein contained should prevent a
State from being sued by its own citizens in cases arising under the Consti-
tution or laws of the United States: can we imagine that it would have been
adopted by the States? The supposition that it would is almost an absurdity
on its face.
Id at 15.
6. See infra notes 65-159 and accompanying text.
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has created a perplexing state immunity doctrine heavily criti-
cized by both scholars and the Supreme Court.7
In its eleventh amendment decisions, the Court has attempted
to balance individual rights against the autonomy of states within
the federal system.8 Until 1989, the Court had approved congres-
sional abrogation of state immunity through only the exercise of
limited and well-defined legislative powers, such as the fourteenth
amendment,9 or the exercise of broad commerce clause powers
accompanied by implied state consent.10
The Court developed a dual standard of review to evaluate
congressional attempts to limit state immunity, which focused on
the legislative power under which Congress acted. In cases in-
volving transgressions upon individual rights protected by four-
teenth amendment legislation," the Court recognized federal court
jurisdiction only if clear statutory language conveyed congres-
sional intent to override state immunity. 2 Employing a stricter
standard when the state's conduct allegedly violated commerce
clause legislation, the Court recognized federal court jurisdiction
only if the state impliedly waived its immunity by participating
in a federally regulated activity under legislation clearly calling
for consent to suit in federal court. 3 This dual standard respected
both the federal government's role as the guarantor of basic
individual rights 4 and eleventh amendment state sovereignty
concerns. 15
7. See Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 519 (1987)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (eleventh amendment doctrine "lacks a textual anchor, an estab-
lished historical foundation, or a clear rationale"); H. FINK & M. TUSHNET, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION: POLICY AND PRACTICE 137 (1984) (eleventh amendment case law is "replete
with historical anomalies, internal inconsistencies, and senseless distinctions").
8. Note, Reconciling Federalism and Individual Rights: The Burger Court's Treatment
of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 68 VA. L. REV. 865, 865 (1982).
9. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
10. See, e.g., Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. State Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
11. The fourteenth amendment provides that
[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, 5 1.
12. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 453-56; see infra notes 95-120 and accompanying
text.
13. See, e.g., Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub.
Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973); see infra notes 79-94 and accompanying text.
14. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-39 (1972).
15. See Note, supra note 8, at 867.
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In the 1989 case of Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,16 however,
the Supreme Court significantly diminished its standard for in-
ferring state consent to federal court jurisdiction under commerce
clause legislation. The Court found state consent not through
state participation in a federally regulated activity, but through
the states' ratification of the commerce clause two hundred years
ago.17 This decision opened the door for Congress to interfere
with state autonomy in any area properly governed by commerce
clause legislation. Although the Court still required a clear ex-
pression of congressional intent to override state immunity, the
Court's elimination of its previous consent standard stripped the
states of any power to control their appearances in federal court.
The Court's decision in Union Gas reduced state immunity
under the eleventh amendment to a mere privilege, revocable at
the will of Congress. Although this decision reconciles the Court's
eleventh amendment jurisprudence with recent changes in the
state sovereignty doctrine under the tenth amendment,' 8 the
Court's refusal to look beyond the statutory language violates
the principle of federalism embodied in the "letter and spirit of
the constitution."' 9
This Note explores the concept of state immunity and the need
for an expanded judicial standard of review to ensure the pro-
tection of the states' role in the federal system. First, this Note
reviews briefly the development of state immunity through ar-
ticle III of the Constitution, the eleventh amendment, and the
Court's decision in Hans v. Louisiana.20 Next, this Note discusses
16. 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989).
17. "'[T]he States surrendered a portion of their sovereignty when they granted
Congress the power to regulate commerce. . . .By empowering Congress to regulate
commerce, . . . the States necessarily surrendered any portion of their sovereignty that
would stand in the way of such regulation."' Id. at 2281 (plurality opinion) (quoting Parden
v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184, 191, 192 (1964)).
18. In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), the
Court rejected the proposition that the tenth amendment embodies a principle of state
sovereignty that limits Congress' ability to regulate states in certain areas. Instead, the
Court relied upon the procedural safeguards of the political process to protect state
interests from federal overreaching. See id. at 552; infra notes 178-92 and accompanying
text. "Process federalism" presumes that the representative structure of the federal
legislature ensures the adequate protection of states' interests. See Wechsler, The Political
Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the
National Government, 54 CoLUM. L. REV. 543, 558 (1954) ("[The national political process
in the United States-and especially the role of the states in the composition and selection
of the central government-is intrinsically well adapted to retarding or restraining new
intrusions by the center on the domain of the states.").
19. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
20. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
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the limitation of state immunity through congressional abrogation
and the Court's final reliance on the clear statement rule in
Union Gas. Drawing from tenth amendment jurisprudence, this
Note then concludes with an alternative perspective on the role
of federalism in the limitation of congressional power to override
state immunity.
STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: ITS ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT
The Origin of State Sovereign Immunity: Common Law
Sovereign Immunity
The principle of sovereign immunity is rooted deeply in the
English common law.2 1 As early as the reign of King Henry III
(1216-1272), English courts granted the king immunity from suits
in his own courts.22 This immunity was not absolute, however,
and numerous private remedies against the ruling sovereign
developed from the reign of Edward I (1272-1307) through the
late eighteenth century?a
The American colonists understood well the doctrine of sov-
ereign immunity.24 In crafting the delicate balance between state
and federal power in the newly formed union, the Framers
21. See C. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 5-8 (1972). In
his Commentaries, Sir William Blackstone observed that despite the protection that the
doctrine of sovereign immunity afforded the king, a subject could rely on the king to
recognize and redress any wrong committed by the king or his ministers. Id. at 7-8
(citations omitted).
That the king can do no wrong, is a necessary and fundamental principle of
the English constitution: meaning only . . . that, in the first place, whatever
may be amiss in the conduct of public affairs is not chargeable personally
on the king; nor is he, but his ministers, accountable for it to the people:
and, secondly, that the prerogative of the crown extends not to do any
injury; for, being created for the benefit of the people, it cannot be exerted
to their prejudice. Whenever therefore it happens, that, by misinformation
or inadvertence, the crown hath been induced to invade the private rights
of any of it's [sic] subjects, though no action will lie against the sovereign,
(for who shall command the king?) yet the law hath furnished the subject
with a decent and respectful mode of removing that invasion, by informing
the king of the true state of the matter in dispute: and, as it presumes that
to know of an injury and to redress it are inseparable in the royal breast, it
then issues as of course, in the king's own name, his orders to his judges to
do justice to the party aggrieved.
3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *254-55 (footnotes omitted).
22. See 0. JACOBS, supra note 21, at 5.
23. See id. at 5-6.
24. See id. at 4-12.
1991] STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 443
grappled with the need for a strong federal judiciary and the
fear that an overly powerful national government would quash
the independent existence of the states.25
The Development of State Sovereign Immunity in the United
States
The Constitution
Article III, section 2 of the Constitution defines the scope of
the federal judicial power in the United States.26 This article
grants federal court jurisdiction in suits brought by the United
States, suits brought by other states, and controversies "between
a State and Citizens of another State."27 Article III fails to
differentiate between suits in which the state is a plaintiff and
those in which the state is a defendant.28
The evolution of the language of article III prior to its adoption
sheds no light on its implications for state sovereign immunity.
At the Constitutional Convention in 1787, Edmund Randolph
proposed a resolution for the establishment of a National Judi-
ciary.2 Language extending the federal judicial power to suits
between states and citizens of another state first appeared in a
report submitted to the Constitutional Convention by the Com-
25. See id. at 9-26. George Mason expressed his fear that "the general government
being paramount to, and in every respect more powerful than the state governments,
the latter must give way to the former." Address in the Ratifying Convention of Virginia
(June 4-12, 1788), reprinted in ANTI-FEDERALISTS VERSUS FEDERALISTS 208-09 (J. Lewis ed.
1967). James Madison feared that without national supremacy in the judicial branch, the
national legislative power might be rendered "unavailing," in that those "expound[ing]
and apply[ing] the laws [would be] connected by their oaths and interests wholly with
the particular states and not with the Union." C. JACOBS, supra note 21, at 11.
26. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consus;-to all Cases of admiralty
and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United States
shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more States;-between
a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of different States,-
between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different
States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States,
Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. CONST. art. III, S 2, cl. 1.
27. Id.
28. See id
29. Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action Against State
Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 1413, 1423 (1975).
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mittee of Detail.3° Because the records of the Constitutional
Convention contain no reference to debate on this passage,31 the
debates that took place at state ratification conventions provide
the only insight into the Framers' intentions.
James Wilson, a member of the Committee of Detail, argued at
the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention that a federal judicial
power extending to cases brought by a citizen of one state against
another state was necessary to promote the constitutional concept
of impartiality. 2 At the Virginia Convention, James Madison, fear-
ing that this provision would leave states open to suit in federal
court for accumulated Revolutionary War debt, argued that the
provision granted federal court jurisdiction only when the state
was the plaintiff.P John Marshall supported Madison's interpreta-
tion, contending that "[it is not rational to suppose that the
sovereign power should be dragged before a court."
The history of the Constitution's ratification reflects a divergence
of views over whether, and in what circumstances, the states would
retain their sovereign immunity. As Justice Powell later noted,
"At most . . . the historical materials show that-to the extent
[the] question [of whether the Constitution would abrogate the
sovereign immunity of the states] was debated-the intentions of
the Framers and Ratifiers were ambiguous."
Chisholm v. Georgia
Soon after the ratification of article III, Alexander Chisholm
called upon the Supreme Court to determine whether private
citizens could subject states to suit in federal court. As the
executor of the estate of South Carolinian Robert Farquar, Chis-
30. The report included the following clause: "The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
shall extend to all cases. . . (except such as shall regard territory or jurisdiction) between
a State and Citizens of another State . . . and between a State or the Citizens thereof
and foreign States, citizens, or subjects." Id. at 1424..
31. "No evidence exists that the members of the Committee thoroughly discussed the
passage, and the Convention as a whole never questioned the Committee in regard to
its meaning." Id. at 1424-25.
32. "When a citizen has a controversy with another state, there ought to be a tribunal
where both parties may stand on a just and equal footing." 2 J. ELLIOTT, THE DEBATES
IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 491
(1836). James Wilson also authored one of the majority opinions supporting this construc-
tion in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
33. See 3 J. ELLIOTT, supra note 32, at 533.
34. Id. at 555.
35. Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 483-84 (1987).
36. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 419.
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holm filed an original action in the Court against the State of
Georgia, seeking to recover a debt owed to Farquar for supplies
that he furnished to Georgia during the Revolutionary War.
Georgia refused to appear, claiming that the federal courts had no
jurisdiction over such a suit. By a four-to-one vote, the Court held
that article III, section 2 of the Constitution conferred jurisdiction
upon the federal courts whenever a citizen of one state sued
another state.3 The Court then entered judgment against Georgia.40
Chief Justice Jay and Justice Wilson in the majority relied
upon the broad philosophical notion that complete sovereignty
was inconsistent with democracy and determined that the Con-
stitution could authorize federal court jurisdiction over states.41
Justices Blair and Cushing restricted their analysis to a literal
interpretation of article III and concluded that the states surren-
dered their sovereignty when they ratified this article.42 Justice
Iredell, the lone dissenter, determined that the federal courts
lacked jurisdiction absent congressional authorization. 43
The Eleventh Amendment and Express State Immunity in
Diversity Cases
Political responses to Chisholm were swift. The day after the
Court announced its decision, Representative Theodore Sedgwick
introduced a resolution in the House for a constitutional amend-
ment calling for complete state immunity.44 A second resolution
37. See id. at 420; Nowak, supra note 29, at 1430-31.
38. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dal.) at 419.
39. See id. at 479.
40. See id. at 480.
41. See Nowak, supra note 29, at 1431-32.
42. See id.
43. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 432-33 (Iredell, J., dissenting). Finding no congressional
grant of federal jurisdiction over assumpsit actions, Iredell limited his decision to the
narrow question of whether article III authorized the Court to hear such a suit. Iredell
believed that congressional power should not extend to the ability to abrogate state
immunity in federal courts: "So much, however, has been said on the constitution, that
it may not be improper to intimate, that my present opinion is strongly against any
construction of it, which will admit, under any circumstances, a compulsive suit against
a state for the recovery of money:' Id. at 449 (Iredell, J., dissenting). Later in his opinion,
however, he expressed serious doubts concerning the judiciary's role in determining such
issues of policy. See id at 450 (Iredell, J., dissenting); Nowak, supra note 29, at 1432-33.
44. That no state shall be liable to one made a party defendant, in any of
the judicial courts, established, or which shall be established under the
authority of the United States, at the suit of any person or persons whether
a citizen or citizens, or a foreigner or foreigners, of any body politic or
corporate, whether within or without the United States.
Nowak, supra note 29, at 1436 (quoting Pennsylvania Journal, Feb. 20, 1793).
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followed, 45 and a third resolution addressing state immunity was
introduced in the Senate on January 2, 1794:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prose-
cuted against one of the United States by citizens of another
State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign State.46
This third resolution became the eleventh amendment. 47
The drafters of the eleventh amendment failed to make their
intentions clear. One theory suggests that the eleventh amend-
ment reaffirmed the general understanding of state immunity at
the time the Framers drafted the Constitution: states retained
their sovereign immunity from suit by individuals, notwithstand-
ing the fact that article III grants federal courts jurisdiction in
all cases between a state and citizens of another state, regardless
of whether the state is a plaintiff or a defendant. 48 Another
theory suggests that the states ratified the amendment out of
fear that federal courts could otherwise compel them to pay
accumulated debts owing to noncitizen creditors.49 The history
behind the passage of the eleventh amendment does not clarify
whether the drafters intended to prevent the federal judiciary
from assuming jurisdiction over such suits or whether the draft-
ers hoped to preclude any branch of the federal government,
including Congress, from authorizing suits against states.50
45. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not extend to afiy suits in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another
State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign State." 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 651-52 (1793).
46. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 26 (1794).
47. On January 14, 1794, the Senate passed the eleventh amendment by a vote of 23-
to-2. Id. at 30. On March 4, 1794, the House of Representatives passed the amendment
by a vote of 81-to-9. Id. at 476-78. Within one year, the requisite number of states ratified
the eleventh amendment. See C. JACOBS, supra note 21, at 67.
48. C. JACOBS, supra note 21, at 67-69.
49. Id. at 68.
50. Professor Nowak argues that the states ratified the eleventh amendment only to
prevent the federal courts from imposing retroactive liabilities on them. He suggests
that the states tacitly approved of Congress' ability to override state immunity:
No evidence exists that the states had the same fear of congressional
authorization of suits against states. Indeed, given the assumption of state
debts by .the Congress in the period following the Revolutionary War it is
most likely that these representatives had implicit faith in the congressional
ability to balance the interests of the state and federal governments.
Nowak, supra note 29, at 1440-41.
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The Eleventh Amendment and Implied State Immunity in
Federal Question Cases
The Supreme Court had few occasions to interpret the eleventh
amendment until nearly one hundred years after its ratification.5'
In Hans v. Louisiana,52 decided in 1890, the Court extended
eleventh amendment state immunity, holding that the eleventh
amendment prohibited a citizen of a state from suing the state
in federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction.-9
The landmark decision in Hans ushered in a century of confusing
analysis and distorted interpretation of the contours of the elev-
enth amendment.54
In Hans, a Louisiana citizen sued Louisiana to recover unpaid
interest on bonds upon which the state had defaulted. 5 Hans
filed suit in federal court, asserting that the state's constitutional
amendment disclaiming liability on the bonds violated the con-
tracts clause of the Constitution.- After stating that the eleventh
amendment unquestionably denied federal court jurisdiction in
suits against states by citizens of other states, whether premised
upon a federal question or diversity of citizenship, the Court
maintained that the principle that a state could not be sued
without its consent was "inherent in the nature of sovereignty."5 7
Justice Bradley looked not to the letter of the eleventh amend-
ment, but to "history and experience and the established order
51. In 1824, the Court restricted the amendment's application to suits in which the
state was a party of record. See Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738,
857-58 (1824).
52. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
53. Id. at 14-15. In 1875, Congress granted federal courts jurisdiction in suits premised
on the presence of a federal question, that is, suits arising under the Constitution or
federal legislation:
ITihe circuit courts of the United States shall have original cognizance,
concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature
at common law or in equity, . . . arising under the Constitution or laws of
the United States, or treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
authority.
Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, S 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470.
54. See infra notes 65-159 and accompanying text. In Welch v. Texas Department of
Highways and Public Transportation, 483 U.S. 468 (1987), eight Supreme Court Justices
argued extensively, but inconclusively, over whether to overrule Hans. Id. at 470-521.
55. Hans, 134 U.S. at 1.
56. Id. at 3. "No State shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts." U.S. CONST. art. I, S 10.
57. Hans, 134 U.S. at 10-13 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 508 (A. Hamilton) (H.
Lodge ed. 1895)).
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of things."' He interpreted the eleventh amendment as a direct
repudiation of Chisholm v. Georgia5 9 and returned to the construc-
tion of article III to ascertain whether the states surrendered
their immunity by ratifying the Constitution. 60 Bradley observed
that, with a few explicit exceptions, the Framers had not intended
to create new causes of action through the language of article
111.61 He recognized further that "[t]he suability of a State without
its consent was a thing unknown to the law."62 In holding that
article III did not alter the doctrine of state immunity existing
at the time of its ratification, Bradley relied substantially upon
the remarks of those Federalists opposed to federal court juris-
diction over state defendants.s
Although the Court in Hans based its decision upon only one
side of the Framers' debate over the need to preserve state
immunity, the Court expressed a principle that became well
established over the course of the next century: "[Tihat the
doctrine of sovereign immunity, for States as well as for the
Federal Government, was part of the understood background
against which the Constitution was adopted, and which its juris-
dictional provisions did not mean to sweep away."64
THE DECLINE OF STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Preliminary Limitations
Prior to 1964, the federal question actions challenged under
the eleventh amendment arose under the Constitution rather
than under a congressional statute.65 Such suits thus came squarely
within the holding of Hans v. Louisiana.66 During this period, the
58. Id. at 14.
59. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
60. Hans, 134 U.S. at 11-15.
61. Id. at 15. "The truth is, that the cognizance of suits and actions unknown to the
law, and forbidden by the law, was not contemplated by the Constitution when establishing
the judicial power of the United States." Id. Article III made justiciable certain contro-
versies unknown at common law, such as controversies between states as to boundary
lines. Id.; see U.S. CONST. art. III, S 2, cl. 1.
62. Hans, 134 U.S. at 16.
63. Id. at 12-14.
64. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2297 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring
and dissenting).
65. Note, More Plenary Than Thou: A Post-Welch Compromise Theory of Congressional
Power to Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1022, 1027 (1988).
66. 134 U.S. 1. The petitioner in Hans alleged a violation of the contracts clause. Id.
at 3; see supra notes 52-63 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court established some basic limitations to the protec-
tion afforded by the eleventh amendment.
By its terms, the eleventh amendment does not preclude suits
brought against a state by the United States 67 or by another
state.r In addition, the amendment does not prohibit either suits
against local governments 69 or, unless the state is the real party
in interest,70 suits against state officials sued in their individual
capacities in federal court for illegal actions.71 Finally, the elev-
enth amendment does not bar suits to enjoin state officials from
enforcing state laws that violate federal law.72
These initial limitations helped define areas excluded from
eleventh amendment shelter, but were useless to measure the
scope of eleventh amendment protection under the Hans princi-
ple. In the 1960's, when Congress began to enact legislation that
arguably left states susceptible to citizen suits in federal court,
the Court finally examined the Hans principle of state immunity
and attempted to develop practical guidelines for its application.73
The Dual Standard of Review: Implied State Consent and the
Clear Statement Rule
Prior to Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,74 the Court permitted
congressional abrogation of state immunity only through the
exercise of specific legislative powers alone, such as the four-
teenth amendment,75 or through the exercise of broad legislative
powers, such as the commerce power, if accompanied by implied
state consent.76 Certain conditions, however, limited Congress'
ability to remove state immunity. When legislating pursuant to
the fourteenth amendment, Congress could override state im-
munity to suit in federal court only if "unmistakably clear"
statutory language conveyed such congressional intent.77 When
67. United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140-41 (1965); U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
68. South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 315-16 (1904); U.S. CONST. amend.
xI.
69. Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890).
70. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 675-78 (1974).
71. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908).
72. Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 393 (1932).
73. See infra notes 74-159 and accompanying text.
74. 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989).
75. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
76. See, e.g., Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. State Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184, 186-87
(1964).
77. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985).
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legislating pursuant to the commerce clause, Congress could
override state immunity only if Congress stated clearly its intent
to do so and the state consented to federal jurisdiction by
subsequently participating in a federally regulated activity.8
In 1964, the Court addressed for the first time whether Con-
gress could grant federal court jurisdiction over a private cause
of action for damages against a state.7 9 In Parden v. Terminal
Railway of Alabama State Docks Department,0 five employees of
a railway owned and operated by Alabama sued the state in
federal court under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA)
for injuries suffered while working for the railway. 81 The Court
upheld federal court jurisdiction in the employees' suit.82
Using broad terms, Justice Brennan addressed the scope of
congressional power under the commerce clause.8 Having first
declared that "the States surrendered a portion of their sover-
eignty when they granted Congress the power to regulate com-
merce," 84 Brennan rested his decision upon the narrow grounds
that, by operating a railway in interstate commerce, Alabama
consented to the provisions of FELA, including federal court
jurisdiction . 5 In Parden, Brennan recognized that, regardless of
Congress' authority to declare states amenable to suit in federal
court, state consent remained the key requirement:
Recognition of the congressional power to render a State suable
under the FELA does not mean that the immunity doctrine,
as embodied in the Eleventh Amendment with respect to
citizens of other States and as extended to the State's own
citizens by the Hans case, is here being overridden. It remains
the law that a State may not be sued by an'individual without
its consent.86
78. See Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health
& Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 284-85 (1973); Parden, 377 U.S. at 192.
79. Parden, 377 U.S. at 187.
80. 377 U.S. 184.
81. Id. at 184-85. FELA provides that "[e]very common carrier by railroad while
engaging in commerce between any of the several States . . .shall be liable in damages
to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce"
and that "[ulnder this chapter an action may be brought in a district court of the United
States." 45 U.S.C. SS 51, 56 (1982).
82. Parden, 377 U.S. at 192.
83. Id. at 190-91.
84. Id. at 191.
85. Id. at 192. "Congress conditioned the right to operate a railroad in interstate
commerce upon amenability to suit in federal court as provided by the [FELA]; by
thereafter operating a railroad in interstate commerce, Alabama must be taken to have
accepted that condition and thus to have consented to suit." Id.
86. Id. The Court suggested that it would infer state consent whenever a state
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The clear statement rule evolved naturally from the principle
of implied state consent that the Court relied upon in Parden.
Because implied state consent to federal jurisdiction must nec-
essarily rest upon some articulated congressional reference to
such jurisdiction, the Court began to require a clear statement
of Congress' intent to limit state immunity in the statutory
language. 7 In Employees of Department of Public Health & Welfare
v. Department of Public Health & Welfare,88 employees of state
hospitals and schools sued the state under the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act (FLSA) for overtime compensation, liquidated damages,
and attorneys' fees.89 Although the FLSA defined state hospitals
and schools as employers and section 16(b) granted any covered
employee a cause of action against his or her employer, 0 the
Court declined to infer that Congress intended to subject states
to suit in federal court for damages under the remedial provisions
of the FLSA.91 The Court distinguished Parden, noting that the
operation of a railroad was a proprietary activity that private
business interests normally controlled, whereas the management
of schools and hospitals was traditionally a governmental activ-
ity.9 2 In this manner, the Court summarily dismissed Parden as
involving only "a rather isolated state activity"9 3 and determined
participated in federally regulated activities subject to federal court jurisdiction. "[W]hen
a State leaves the sphere that is exclusively its own and enters into activities subject to
congressional regulation, it subjects itself to that regulation as fully as if it were a
private person or corporation." Id. at 196.
87. See Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health
& Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 281. Although the original statute did not apply to government employees,
the 1966 amendments extended its provisions regulating minimum wage and overtime
pay to "employees of a State, or a political subdivision thereof, employed [] in a hospital,
institution, or school." Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 102(b), 80 Stat. 830, 831 (1966), amended by
29 U.S.C. S 203(d), (r) (1974).
90. Any employer who violates . . . this title shall be liable to the employee
or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or
their unpaid overtime compensation . . . and in an additional equal amount
as liquidated damages . . . . An action to recover the liability . . . may be
maintained. . . in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction ....
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982).
91. See Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. at 284-85. Bcause S 216(b) of
the FLSA delegated jurisdiction over FLSA suits to "any court of competent jurisdiction,"
without specifying federal courts, the Court refrained from an expansive interpretation
of congressional intent. Id. at 285.
92. See id. The Court later rejected this distinction between proprietary and traditional
government activities in the context of the tenth amendment. Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 538-47 (1985); see infra notes 178-92 and accompanying
text.
93. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. at 285.
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that when Congress intended to place new fiscal burdens on
states through their involvement in traditional governmental
activities, Congress could not do so silently9 4
Soon after Department of Public Health & Welfare, the Court
reaffirmed its adherence to the clear statement rule, this time
in construing fourteenth amendment legislation in Edelman v.
Jordan.95 The Court held that, absent clear congressional author-
ization, the eleventh amendment precluded federal jurisdiction
over suits against states in which the plaintiffs sought retro-
spective damages for alleged violations of fourteenth amendment
legislation . 8 The Court rejected the lower court's conclusion that
the state's mere participation in the federally funded Aid to the
Aged, Blind, or Disabled program constituted constructive con-
sent to federal jurisdiction.9 7 Although the Court discussed at
length the distinction between prospective and retrospective
relief, 8 it denied federal jurisdiction based upon the statute's
failure to satisfy the clear statement rule.99
In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,100 however, the Court determined that
Congress satisfied the clear statement rule in the 1972 amend-
ments to title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.101 In Fitzpatrick,
the Court found that the eleventh amendment did not bar a
federal court from granting a retroactive award of wrongfully
withheld retirement benefits. 10 2 The 1972 amendments, passed
94. See id. at 284-85. "It is not easy to infer that Congress in legislating pursuant to
the Commerce Clause, which has grown to vast proportions in its applications, desired
silently to deprive the States of an immunity they have long enjoyed under another part
of the Constitution." Id. at 285.
95. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974).
96. Id. Although the plaintiff in Edelman sued the nominal defendant, the Director of
the Illinois Department of Public Aid, to enjoin him from future violations of the Social
Security Act, the plaintiff also sought retrospective damages in the nature of equitable
restitution of the wrongfully withheld statutory benefits. Id. at 656. Justice Rehnquist
noted that the injunctive relief sought fell within the ambit of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.
123 (1908), which upheld an individual's right to enjoin a state official from enforcing an
unconstitutional statute, notwithstanding the eleventh amendment. Edelman, 415 U.S. at
656. When Rehnquist considered the retrospective portion of the award, he observed
that "[t]hese funds will obviously not be paid out of the pocket of petitioner Edelman."
Id. at 664. Because general state revenues inevitably would provide the funds to satisfy
such an award, the Court held that this suit essentially sought damages against the state
and was therefore barred by the eleventh amendment. Id. at 668-69.
97. Id. at 673.
98. Id. at 664-68.
99. See id. at 673.
100. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988). Specifically, the 1972 amendments challenged included SS
2000e(a), (b), (f) and SS 2000e-5(a)-(g), (k). Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 447-50.
102. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 451-56.
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pursuant to section five of the fourteenth amendment, authorized
federal courts to award money damages to a private individual
whenever a court found that a state government had subjected
that person to employment discrimination.10 3 The Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit upheld the district court's grant of
prospective injunctive relief against the wrongful state officials,
but denied petitioners' request for retrospective money dam-
ages. 0 4
Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist remarked that the
enforcement provision of the fourteenth amendment, which grants
Congress authority to enforce the substantive provisions of the
amendment "by appropriate legislation,"'05 limits the eleventh
amendment and the principle of state sovereignty that it embod-
ies.106 The Court found that the 1972 amendments, which made
title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 applicable to state and
local governments,'10 7 authorized employees to sue the state as
an employer in federal court. 0 8 This clear expression of congres-
sional intent to subject states to the same standards as private
employers allowed the imposition of both prospective and retro-
spective relief upon a state.0 9
In Fitzpatrick, Rehnquist intimated that the Court would not
grant Congress the same free rein to abrogate state immunity
when legislating pursuant to powers other than the fourteenth
amendment."0 Rehnquist asserted, "We think that Congress may,
in determining what is 'appropriate legislation' for the purpose
of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, pro-
vide for private suits against States or state officials which are
constitutionally impermissible in other contexts.""' The dual stan-
dard that Rehnquist implicitly supported ensured adequate pro-
tection of civil rights without infringing upon the well-established
concept of state immunity."2
103. See id. at 447.
104. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 519 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1975), modified, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
The court of appeals relied on Edelman in holding that "a private federal action for
retroactive damages" is not a "constitutionally permissible method of enforcing Fourteenth
Amendment rights." Id. at 569-70.
105. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, 5 5.
106. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 453.
107. 42 U.S.C. S 2000e(a) (1988).
108. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 452.
109. Id. at 451-56.
110. See id. at 456.
111. Id. (emphasis added).
112. See Note, supra note 8, at 881-91 (arguing that the "paramount importance" of
civil rights justifies "a less precise articulation of congressional intent" to override state
immunity).
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The Court's clear statement standard endured. In Atascadero
State Hospital v. Scanlon,"3 the plaintiff claimed that California
violated the Rehabilitation Act of 1973"1 by denying him em-
ployment because of physical disabilities.1 5 The Act prohibited
employment discrimination against otherwise qualified handi-
capped persons by any recipient of federal assistance.1 16 California
received such federal assistance.117
Although the legislative history suggested that Congress in-
tended for the Act's remedies to apply to the states, the Court
found no clear statement of this intention in the statute: "A
general authorization for suit in federal court is not the kind of
unequivocal statutory language sufficient to abrogate the Elev-
enth Amendment. When Congress chooses to subject the States
to federal jurisdiction, it must do so specifically."" 8 In response
to the court of appeals' holding that the state had consented to
suit in federal court by accepting funds under the Rehabilitation
Act," 9 the Court in Atascadero found no clear statement of
congressional intent to condition the acceptance of federal funds
on waiver of state immunity. 20
When the question of congressional authority to abrogate state
immunity under the commerce clause surfaced again in Welch v.
Texas Department of Highways and Public Transportation,121 Con-
gress' failure to satisfy the clear statement requirement pre-
vented the Court from finding congressional power to abrogate
state immunity absent a state's consent.122 In Welch, an employee
of the state highway department sued the state under the Jones
Act'2 3 to recover for injuries she received while working.124 The
113. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
114. 29 U.S.C. SS 701-796 (1988).
115. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 236.
116. 29 U.S.C. S 794.
117. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 236.
118. Id. at 246.
119. See Scanlon v. Atascadero State Hosp., 735 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473 U.S.
234 (1985).
120. "The Act likewise falls far short of manifesting a clear intent to condition
participation in the programs funded under the Act on a State's consent to waive its
constitutional immunity." Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 247.
121. 483 U.S. 468 (1987).
122. The Court assumed, for the purpose of analyzing Jean Welch's case, that Congress
had the authority to subject unconsenting states to suit in federal court under its
commerce clause powers, but found that the legislation at issue failed to clearly express
congressional intent to abrogate state immunity. See id. at 475 (plurality opinion). The
Court thus had no occasion to examine the validity of its initial assumption.
123. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988). Section 33 of the Jones Act allows any seaman suffering
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Court overruled Parden, insofar as it allowed the Court to infer
congressional intent to abrogate state immunity absent express
statutory language,125 and upheld Atascadero's requirement of
unequivocal statutory language in order to override state im-
munity. 126
In Welch, an evenly divided Court argued over the continuing
validity of Hans v. Louisiana.1' Both factions discussed exten-
sively the history of state sovereign immunity and the eleventh
amendment. 2s The split, however, prevented the Court from
overruling Hans.
Justice Brennan, in a dissenting opinion, continued his attack
on the validity of state sovereign immunity that he began in
Atascadero.'2 Noting the complexity of the rules developed under
the state immunity doctrine, Brennan maintained his disdain for
continued reliance on Hans:
[T]he doctrine that has thus been created is pernicious. In an
era when sovereign immunity has been generally recognized
by courts and legislatures as an anachronistic and unnecessary
remnant of a feudal legal system, . . the Court has aggres-
sively expanded its scope .... [T]he current doctrine intrudes
on the ideal of liberty under law by protecting the States from
the consequences of their ilegal conduct. And the decision
obstructs the sound operation of our federal system by limiting
the ability of Congress to take steps it deems necessary and
proper to achieve national goals within its constitutional au-
thority.130
a personal injury during the course of employment to recover damages from his employer.
See id. 5 688(a). Jean Welch sustained injuries while working on a ferry dock. Welch, 483
U.S. at 471 (plurality opinion).
124. Welch, 483 U.S. at 470-71 (plurality opinion).
125. See supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of Pardpn v. Terminal
Railway of Alabama State Docks Department, 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
126. Welch, 483 U.S. at 476-78 (plurality opinion). See supra notes 113-20 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
127. Justices Powell, White, O'Connor, and the Chief Justice argued for the continuing
validity of Hans v. Louisiana. Welch, 483 U.S. at 486 (plurality opinion). Justices Brennan,
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens urged the Court to overrule Hans. Id. at 519-21. Justice
Scalia was unwilling to address the matter:
I find both the correctness of Hans as an original matter, and the feasibility,
if it was wrong, of correcting it without distorting what we have done in
tacit reliance upon it, complex enough questions that I am unwilling to
address them in a case whose presentation focused on other matters.
Id. at 496 (Scalia, J., concurring).
128. See id. at 478-88 (plurality opinion); ia at 509-21 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
129. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 247-302 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
130. Welch, 483 U.S. at 520-21 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Atascadero, 473 U.S.
at 302 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
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Justice Powell, however, defended the continuing vitality of
Hans by noting that the structure of the federal system required
state sovereign immunity.13' Powell also noted that the principle
of state immunity embodied in Hans "has been among the most
stable in our constitutional jurisprudence."'132 This stability, in
combination with the doctrine of stare decisis, convinced Powell
that the dissenters' arguments fell "far short of justifying such
a drastic repudiation of this Court's prior decisions."133
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.: THE DEMISE OF STATE
IMMUNITY
The Supreme Court's evisceration of eleventh amendment state
immunity under Hans culminated in its decision in Pennsylvania
v. Union Gas Co. 34 In Union Gas, the Court held that Congress
can create private causes of action against states when legislating
pursuant to the commerce clause 13 5 and can grant federal courts
jurisdiction to hear such suits merely by satisfying the clear
statement rule. 36 The Court purportedly still required state
consent, but found that state approval of the commerce power
indicated blanket consent to federal jurisdiction in any suit against
them based upon congressionally created causes of action. 137
The dispute in Union Gas centered on the cleanup of the
Nation's first emergency Superfund site. The predecessors of
Union Gas Company operated a coal gasification plant along a
creek in Pennsylvania for about fifty years.' 1 After acquiring an
easement to the property along the creek in 1980, the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania conducted excavations, during which it
struck a large coal tar deposit, releasing coal tar into the creek.139
Pennsylvania and the federal government cleaned the site
together, and the federal government reimbursed Pennsylvania
131. Id. at 486-88 (plurality opinion).
132. Id. at 486.
133. Id. at 494-95. Brennan chose not to pursue his argument to overrule Hans in
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989), in which the plurality decided that
Congress can abrogate state immunity under any of its powers, rendering the Hans
principle "a practical nullity." Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2302 (Scalia, J., concurring and
dissenting); see infra notes 134-59 and accompanying text.
134. 109 S. Ct. 2273.
135. Id. at 2280-86 (plurality opinion).
136. Id. at 2277-80 (majority opinion).
137. Id. at 2284 (plurality opinion).
138. Id. at 2276 (majority opinion).
139. Id.
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for its cleanup costs. 140 The United States then sued Union Gas
Company for recovery of the cleanup costs under sections 104
and 106 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA),141 alleging that
Union Gas Company and its predecessors had deposited coal tar
in the ground near the creek.4 2 Union Gas Company filed a third-
party complaint against Pennsylvania, claiming that the state
was responsible for a portion of the costs as an "owner or
operator" of the site 43 because its flood control efforts had
negligently caused or contributed to the coal tar contamination
of the creek. 44 The district court dismissed the third-party claim,
but while the dismissal was on appeal, Congress amended
CERCLA with the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act of 1986 (SARA),' 45 which included states among those poten-
tially liable for monetary damages under CERCLA. On remand,
the court of appeals upheld Union Gas Company's right to sue
Pennsylvania.146
The Supreme Court searched the language of CERCLA, as
amended by SARA, for a clear expression of congressional intent
to hold states liable in damages for conduct described in the
statute. 47 Justice Brennan found "a message of unmistakable
clarity"'48 that Congress intended states to be liable for hazardous
waste site cleanup costs along with other responsible parties.' 49
140. Id.
141. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9606 (1988).
142. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2277.
143. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
144. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2277.
145. Pub. L. No. 99499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
146. United States v. Union Gas Co., 832 F.2d 1343 (3d Cir. 1987), aftd, 109 S. Ct. 2273
(1989).
147. See Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2277-80. If the Court had failed to find a clear
congressional intent to override state immunity, it would have barred the suit, regardless
of congressional intent to apply the provisions of the statute to the states. See Atascadero
State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985); Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health &
Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
148. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2278.
149. Id. CERCLA describes both "persons" and "owners or operators" as parties
potentially responsible for cleanup costs. 42 U.S.C. S 9607(a) (1988). In addition, the statute
explicitly includes "states" in the category of "persons" and defines "owners or operators"
as "persons" undertaking certain activities. Id. SS 9601(21), (20)(A). SARA, however,
excludes states from the category of "owners or operators" in certain narrow circum-
stances. Id. § 9601(20)(D). States are not owners or operators if they "acquired ownership
or control involuntarily through bankruptcy, tax delinquency, abandonment, or other
circumstances in which the government involuntarily acquires title by virtue of its function
as sovereign." Id. Otherwise, SARA provides that states will be subject to liability to
the same extent as a private person. Id.
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Having found that CERCLA and SARA clearly permitted suits
for money damages against states in federal court, the Court
turned to the question of Congress' ability to abrogate state
immunity under the commerce clause.150 Brennan analogized the
commerce clause to the fourteenth amendment and found suffi-
cient similarities to justify treating alike congressional abrogation
of state immunity under either provision. 151 Brennan noted that
"[l]ike the Fourteenth Amendment, the Commerce Clause ...
gives power to Congress . ..while it takes power away from
the States.' 1 2 The reasoning of Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,'5 which
explained congressional abrogation of state immunity under the
fourteenth amendment, applied equally to abrogation under the
commerce clause:
Such enforcement [of the prohibitions of the fourteenth amend-
ment] is no invasion of State sovereignty. No law can be, which
the people of the States have, by the Constitution of the United
States, empowered Congress to enact .... [I]n exercising her
rights, a State cannot disregard the limitations which the
Federal Constitution has applied to her power. Her rights do
not reach to that extent. Nor can she deny to the general
government the right to exercise all its granted powers, though
they may interfere with the full enjoyment of rights she would
have if those powers had not been thus granted. Indeed, every
addition of power to the general government involves a cor-
responding diminution of the governmental powers of the States.
It is carved out of them.'4
The Court thus found state consent'5 in Pennsylvania's ratifi-
cation of the commerce clause power in the Constitution two
hundred years ago. Curiously, Brennan authored both the major-
ity opinion in Parden and the plurality opinion in Union Gas. In
Parden, the Court premised state consent on post-federal-legis-
lation participation in a federally regulated activity, rather than
150. See Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2281-86 (plurality opinion).
151. Id. at 2282-83.
152. Id. at 2282.
153. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
154. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879), quoted in Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 454-
55.
155. "It remains the law that a State may not be sued by an individual without its
consent." Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. State Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184, 192 (1964); see
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 239-40 (1985); Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651, 672 (1974); Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of
Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 281 n.1 (1973).
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on the state's ratification of the commerce clause. 156 In Union
Gas, however, the Court inferred state consent through the
ratification of Congress' commerce powers. 15 7 The adoption of the
state consent rationale of Parden would have denied federal
jurisdiction in Union Gas, for Pennsylvania's actions that gave
rise to liability under CERCLA occurred six years before SARA
extended CERCLA's definition of potentially responsible parties
to the states.' S
Congressional ability to abrogate state immunity retroactively
poses a serious dilemma to states. Parden implied that states
can control their amenability to suit in federal courts under
commerce clause legislation by choosing either to participate or
to refrain from participating in federally regulated activities. 5 9
Union Gas, however, destroyed this ability of states to control
their own destinies. After Union Gas, a state's actions may render
it liable to third parties should Congress choose to create such
a cause of action at some future time.
THE EMERGENCE OF PROCESS FEDERALISM IN TENTH
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
The Court's clear statement rule is essentially the crudest form
of process federalism, the doctrine under which the Court accepts
the validity of legislation so long as it results from a properly
functioning political process. 60 The rocky evolution of process
156. Parden, 377 U.S. at 192.
157. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2284 (1989) (plurality opinion).
"[Bly empowering Congress to regulate commerce,. . . the States necessarily surrendered
any portion of their sovereignty that would stand in the way of such regulation." Id. at
2281 (quoting Parden, 377 U.S. at 192).
158. See Brief for Petitioner at 20, Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 832 F.2d 1343 (3d
Cir. 1987) (No. 87-1241), cert. granted, 485 U.S. 958 (1988).
159. Parden, 377 U.S. at 192.
160. See generally Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of
Federalism After Garcia, 1985 Sup. CT. REv. 341, 359-80 (exploring the potential scope of
the process-oriented standard of review). Professor Rapaczynski's simple version of the
process theory is as follows:
The Constitution is a democratic document, which means that the decisions
of the majority of the representatives freely elected by the majority of the
people should not be upset, and judicial intervention-which always raises
a prima facie presumption of countermajoritarianism-should be limited to
cases in which something in the process suggests that the decision deviates
from the majority's will.
Id. at 369. The Court's scrutiny of the functioning of the political process under the clear
statement rule is minimal; the Court presumes the adequate functioning of the represen-
tative process whenever Congress clearly expresses its intent in the statutory language.
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federalism began with the Court's attempts to apply sovereignty-
based limitations to federal legislative powers in National League
of Cities v. Usery.161
From 1937 to the 1970's, the Court retreated from judicially
enforced substantive guarantees of state sovereignty. 62 In the
1976 landmark decision of National League of Cities, however,
the Court resumed an active role in defending state autonomy
from federal intrusion. 63 In that decision, the Court found that
the tenth amendment 6 4 embodied a principle of sovereignty-based
limitations on congressional power.
65
The renewed concern for state sovereignty ended abruptly
nine years later in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority. 66 After several unsuccessful attempts to define the
precise contours of state sovereignty under the tenth amendment,
the Court in Garcia renounced the decisions in National League
of Cities and its progeny and endorsed instead the theory that
the Framers structured the federal government in a manner that
adequately protected the states from congressional overreach-
ing. 67
This abandonment of a sovereignty-based standard of review
in tenth amendment jurisprudence was an important precursor
to the rejection of an immutable sphere of state sovereign im-
munity under the eleventh amendment in Pennsylvania v. Union
Gas Co.'68
See Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. 2273 passim. But cf. Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court 1988
Term: Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 74-98 (1989) (presenting
the flaws of the "majoritarian paradigm," such as the Court's commitment to defer to
the majoritarian decisionmaking process).
161. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
162. See Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L.
REV. 847, 847 & n.1 (1979).
163. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845.
164. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST.
amend. X.
165. See National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 842-43.
While the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as a "truism," stating
merely that "all is retained which has not been surrendered," it is not
without significance. The Amendment expressly declares the constitutional
policy that Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the
States' integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal system.
Id. (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975) (citation omitted)).
166. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
167. See id. at 550-52, 556-57. "State sovereign interests, then, are more properly
protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than
by judicially created limitations on federal power." Id. at 552.
168. 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2280-86 (1989) (plurality opinion).
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The State Sovereignty Approach
In National League of Cities, the Court struck down the 1974
amendment to the FLSA, which applied the minimum wage and
overtime pay provisions of the FLSA to state employees. 169 Justice
Rehnquist recognized that "there are limits upon the power of
Congress to override state sovereignty, even when exercising its
otherwise plenary powers to tax or to regulate commerce.' 170
Emphasizing "the essential role of the States in our federal
system of government,"' 17 1 the Court interpreted the tenth amend-
ment to stand for "the constitutional policy that Congress may
not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity
or their ability to function effectively in a federal system."'17 2
Five Justices found that the constitutional principle of federalism
forbids federal regulations that "directly displace the States'
freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional
governmental functions."' 7 3
In decisions subsequent to National League of Cities, lower
courts attempted to adhere to the principle that state sovereignty
protects traditional governmental functions from federal inter-
ference; however, the ensuing classifications of state functions
defied any logical consistency.'7 4 In Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Association,'7 5 the Court identified four
conditions that a state must satisfy to be immune from federal
encroachment.'7 6 In practice, however, no state ever convinced
169. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 837-40.
170. Id. at 842.
171. Id. at 844.
172. Id. at 843 (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975)).
173. Id. at 852. Justice Rehnquist authored the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Powell. The Court found that applying the
minimum wage and overtime pay provisions of the Act to state employees would
"significantly alter or displace the States' abilities to structure employer-employee rela-
tionships in such areas as fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public health, and
parks and recreation." Id. at 851.
174. Lower courts defined regulating ambulance services, licensing automobile drivers,
operating a municipal airport, performing solid waste disposal, and operating a highway
authority as protected functions under National League of Cities. See Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 538 (1985), and cases cited therein. Courts
denied protection to the issuance of industrial development bonds, regulation of intrastate
natural gas sales, regulation of traffic on public roads, regulation of air transportation,
operation of a telephone system, leasing and sale of natural gas, operation of a mental
health facility, and provision of in-house domestic services for the aged and handicapped.
See id. at 538-39 and cases cited therein.
175. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
176. To prevail, a state would have to prove each of the following requirements. First,
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the Court that any federal regulation satisfied the Hodel test.177
The Process-Oriented Approach
After reviewing the long, unsuccessful struggle of federal and
state courts to identify traditional state functions, 78 the Court
in Garcia rejected the state sovereignty approach entirely and
adopted a process-oriented standard of review over congressional
exercise of commerce clause powers. 79 In Garcia, the Court found
the state sovereignty approach not only unworkable, as evidenced
by the inconsistent results in lower court decisions, but also
unsound in principle and violative of federalism. 8"
The Garcia controversy focused on the identification of "tra-
ditional governmental functions."'' Chief Justice Burger had
observed previously that "[t]he determination of whether a fed-
eral law impairs a state's authority with respect to 'areas of
the federal statute at issue must regulate "'States as States.'" Id. at 287 (quoting National
League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 854). Second, the statute must address matters that are
indisputably "'attributes of state sovereignty."' Id. at 288 (quoting National League of
Cities, 426 U.S. at 845). Third, state compliance with the federal obligation must directly
impair the states' ability "'to structure integral operations in areas of traditional govern-
mental functions."' Id. (quoting National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852). Fourth, the
relation of state and federal interests must not be such that "the nature of the federal
interest advanced ...justifies state submission." Id at 288 n.29.
177. See, e.g., EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 236-39 (1983) (interpreting the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act as extending the definition of "employer" to state and
local governments); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 770 n.33 (1982) (Congress' control
of state regulatory authorities under the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978
was a valid use of its power under the commerce clause).
178. "[Tlhe history of the American idea of state sovereignty turns out . . . to be the
story of a succession of vain attempts to define some substantive domain over which
exclusive and ultimate state authority could be confidently asserted." Rapaczynski, supra
note 160, at 351.
179. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985).
180. Id. at 531. Significantly, the same five Justices who upheld the principle of process
federalism in Garcia also advocated the simple statutory construction standard of review
in Union Gas. Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and White all fully endorsed
a restrictive standard of judicial review over both tenth and eleventh amendment
controversies. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989); Garcia, 469 U.S.
528. Justice Souter's replacement of Justice Brennan, however, may create a void in this
majority.
By contrast, the dissenting Justices in these two opinions have followed changes in
the Court's membership. In Garcia, Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor, urged the Court to uphold some substantive realm of
state sovereignty whereas in Union Gas, Justices Scalia and Kennedy succeeded Burger
and Powell in standing behind the principle of state immunity. Garcia,* 469 U.S. at 579
(Powell, J., dissenting); Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2303 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting).
181. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 530 (quoting National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833,
852 (1976)).
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traditional [state] functions' may at times be a difficult one."'182
Cases subsequent to National League of Cities revealed the un-
derstated truth of the Chief Justice's comment.1s The Court
explored various approaches to this difficult 'task, examining the
state activity in terms of its historical foundation as a state
function, classifying state activities as either "essential" or "non-
essential," and distinguishing between "governmental" and "pro-
prietary" functions.es In Garcia, Justice Blackmun found that
any judicially created distinctions would disturb the principle of
federalism upon which the United States was founded.18 5
The Court in Garcia doubted the ability of the judicial branch
to identify "principled constitutional limitations on the scope of
Congress' Commerce Clause powers over the States merely by
relying on a priori definitions of state sovereignty."''8 6 Aside from
this problem, however, Blackmun asserted "a more fundamental
reason" for abandoning the Court's National League of Cities role
as protector of state sovereignty: "The sovereignty of the States
is limited by the Constitution itself."' 87 The Constitution limits
state sovereignty through the powers delegated to Congress
under article I.188 Article III precludes the states from making
"authoritative determinations of law."'89 More specifically, the
application of the greater part of the Bill of Rights to the states
through the fourteenth amendment limits significantly the sov-
ereign authority of the states "to legislate with respect to their
citizens and to conduct their own affairs."'190
The divestiture of state sovereignty throughout the Constitu-
tion points to a limited area of state sovereignty, protected,
according to Garcia, only "by procedural safeguards inherent in
the structure of the federal system."'19 Only a finding of failure
in the national political process will justify judicially imposed
182. United Trafnsp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678, 684 (1982) (quoting National
League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852).
183. See supra note 174.
184. See, e.g., Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. at 686.
185. "The problem is that neither the governmentallproprietary distinction nor any
other that purports to separate out important governmental functions can be faithful to
the role of federalism in a democratic society:' Garcia, 469 U.S. at 545-46.
186. Id. at 548.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 549.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 552.
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substantive restraints on any exercise of congressional power. 192
The Court thus retains a circumscribed ability to intervene when
federal legislation results from such a process failure.
The Garcia decision failed to elaborate on the specifics of the
Court's new process-oriented standard of judicial review.193 In
eleventh amendment jurisprudence, the Court has limited its
process review to a simplistic examination of statutory lan-
guage. 94 A functional theory of process-oriented judicial review
need not result in such a limited power:
[Pirocess jurisprudence does not limit the scope of judicial
intervention to explicitly procedural remedies or to the en-
forcement of specifically procedural principles. It aims rather
at an elaboration of judicial standards, the justification of which
does not rely on the desirability of specific substantive results
but rests instead on the identification of some defects in the
political process that prevent it from operating in accordance
with the function assigned to it in the Constitution. 195
Professor Rapaczynski suggests that a court, suspicious of leg-
islation that inhibits individual rights, could "attempt to identify
some distortions in [the democratic] process that account for [the]
presumably abnormal results."' 96 In the context of the eleventh
amendment, a court could surpass limited review of statutory
language within the confines of a process-oriented approach and
examine the extent of state participation in the representative
political process. A court could uphold state immunity upon
discovering that the political process essentially denied states
the ability to function as part of the federal system.197 Rather
192. See id. at 554. The justification for the restraint on powers derived from the
commerce clause stems from "the procedural nature of this basic limitation." Id.
193. "Garcia's importance lies, above all, in revealing the absence of anything ap-
proaching a well elaborated theory of federalism that would provide a solid intellectual
framework for an articulation of the Justices' divergent views on state-national relations."
Rapaczynski, supra note 160, at 341-42.
194. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989) (in which the Court
announced its application of the clear statement rule to all congressional attempts to
abrogate state immunity).
195. Rapaczynski, supra note 160, at 365.
196. Id.
197. Professor Rapaczynski's tenth amendment example aptly illustrates the potential
breadth of the process review approach:
Should it turn out ... on the basis of a well-grounded analysis of the
significance of local politics for the proper functioning of the national political
process, that certain systemic characteristics of the national government
[Vol. 32:439
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than expand on the process-oriented review approach of Garcia,
however, the Court in Union Gas limited it to the mere review
of statutory language. 198
CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO ABROGATE STATE IMMUNITY UNDER
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE: THE NEED FOR AN EXPANDED
STANDARD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
In both tenth and eleventh amendment jurisprudence, the
Supreme Court has reluctantly relinquished any notion of state
sovereignty inherent in the Constitution. 199 The principle of elev-
enth amendment state immunity as reflected in Hans v.
Louisiana00 is not, however, an "antidemocratic anachronism. ' 0 '
State sovereignty under both the tenth and eleventh amendments
continues to receive the support of several members of the
Court.
202
The decisions in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority2 3 and Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.20 4 each attracted
only five members of the Court. Justice Brennan's recent depar-
ture from the Court, as a member of the majority in Garcia and
the author of the Court's opinion in Union Gas, leaves an even
split among the remaining Justices over the issue of both tenth
and eleventh amendment state sovereignty.20 5 New Supreme Court
make it prone to fail to recognize the interdependence between its own
health and the robustness of political life in the states, the Court might view
with suspicion federal interference with the integrity of some vital govern-
mental operations of the states, in much the same way as it applied its
"strict scrutiny" analysis to governmental actions involving race-based clas-
sifications.
Id. at 366.
198. See Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. 2273 passim.
199. The single exception is the eleventh amendment's explicit recognition that states
retain sovereign immunity from suit in federal court when controversies arise with
citizens of other states. In such cases, Congress has no authority to abrogate state
immunity. As Justice Stevens succinctly stated, "A statute cannot amend the Constitu-
tion." Id. at 2286 (Stevens, J., concurring).
200. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
201. Note, supra note 8, at 865 (footnotes omitted).
202. See infra note 205.
203. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
204. 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989). See supra note 180 for a discussion of the Justices' alignment
in Garcia and Union Gas.
205. Four dissenting Justices in Garcia stated explicitly that they stand prepared to
overrule Garcia. "[The] principle [of tenth amendment state sovereignty] will, I am
confident, in time again command the support of a majority of this Court." Garcia, 469
U.S. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see id. at 557 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 580
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Justice Souter could conceivably affect the resurrection of state
sovereignty as an integral part of the federal system.20 6
In Union Gas, the Court adhered to the doctrine of process
federalism without refining its contours. The doctrine of process
federalism itself does not limit the Court's review to a simplistic
clear statement analysis.20 7 The judiciary's ability to look beyond
the statutory language and allow states some control over their
exposure in federal court without transgressing process federal-
ism should resurrect the Court's dual standard of review.
A standard of review that distinguishes between congressional
abrogation of state immunity under limited powers, such as the
fourteenth amendment, and broader powers, such as the com-
merce clause, would preserve state autonomy in areas in which
the states stand most vulnerable to federal intrusion 20 8 and still
provide full federal protection of individual rights. Using explicit
language, the fourteenth amendment "clearly contemplates limi-
tations on [state] authority" 2°9 and grants Congress the power to
enforce its provisions.210 This specific grant of power, along with
the "paramount importance of individual rights,"'21 should lead
the Court to defer to Congress' broad authority to legislate
pursuant to that amendment and to judge abrogation of state
immunity under the well-established clear statement rule.
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). Four members of the current Court support state immunity as
a structural component of federalism. "[Tihe doctrine of sovereign immunity, for States
as well as for the Federal Government, was part of the understood background against
which the Constitution was adopted, and which its jurisdictional provisions did not mean
to sweep away." Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2297 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting).
206. The three Reagan era Supreme Court Justices, Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin
Scalia, and Anthony M. Kennedy, along with Chief Justice Rehnquist, all endorse the
continuing validity of the Hans state immunity principle. See Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at
2296-303 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting). Assuming that Professor Chemerinsky is
correct in that "[t]he Reagan legacy of a conservative Court seems secure for many years
to come," Chemerinsky, supra note 160, at 45, a new conservative Justice will likely join
his conservative colleagues in reaffirming the Court's holding in Hans.
207. See supra note 197.
208. Although the Court has approved Congress' broad authority to regulate states
under the commerce clause, this interpretation of congressional power should not extend
to the power to abrogate state immunity without state consent. Permitting Congress to
confer federal jurisdiction over states poses a greater threat to the federal-state balance
of powers than do congressional regulatory powers. Note, supra note 65, at 1040 n.114.
209. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 453 (1976).
210. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, S 5.
211. See Note, supra note 8, at 891 (suggesting that the Court has required less precise
articulations of congressional intent to abrogate state immunity in the context of the
fourteenth amendment because of the "paramount importance of individual rights").
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Other congressional powers such as the commerce power, how-
ever, only impliedly remove states' control while granting control
to the federal government; thus, the Court ought to examine
with more care congressional abrogation of state immunity pur-
suant to these powers. This approach does not imply that the
Court should carve out any range of absolutely protected state
activity of the sort refuted in Garcia. Rather, the Court should
require both firm evidence of a full consideration of states'
interests in Congress and a clear indication of consent to suit
from the state involved.
The Judiciary as the Protectorate of Constitutional Values
The Court has consistently refused to subject states to private
suits in federal court unless the federal statute involved expressly
includes states as potential defendants. 212 Justice Brennan argued
that because both Houses of the federal legislature fully represent
the states,
[diecisions upon the extent of federal intervention under the
Commerce Clause into the affairs of the States are in that
sense decisions of the States themselves. . . . Any realistic
assessment of our federal political system, dominated as it is
by representatives of the people elected from the States, yields
the conclusion that it is highly unlikely that those represen-
tatives will ever be motivated to disregard totally the concerns
of these States.213
The clear statement rule inherently assumes that federal leg-
islators might overlook subtle implications of new legislation and
212. In Parden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama State Docks Department, 377 U.S. 184-
190-97 (1964), the Court, per Justice Brennan, upheld congressional abrogation of state
immunity under the FELA, even though the Act did not expressly articulate a congres-
sional intent to subject states to suit on the same terms as any other railroad employer.
The dissenters in Parden disagreed on this point: "A decent respect for the normally
preferred position of constitutional rights dictates that if Congress decides to exercise
its power to condition privileges within its control on the forfeiture of constitutional
rights its intention to do so should appear with unmistakable clarity" Id. at 199 (White,
J., dissenting). The dissenters' view prevailed. In subsequent decisions, the Court upheld
state immunity, even in cases in which Congress apparently intended statutes to apply
to the states, because Congress failed to explicitly include states in the class of defendants
liable for violations of the statutes. See, e.g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979);
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 672 (1974); Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare
v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 285 (1973).
213. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 876-77 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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fail to perceive the enormous consequences of state liability to
private citizens when legislation impliedly abrogates state im-
munity. The Court's insistence on unequivocal language in the
legislation itself diminishes somewhat the possibility of such a
failure in the political process, whereby state interests may be
inadvertently sacrificed in favor of federal policies.2 14
By itself, however, the clear statement standard cannot ade-
quately protect the states' essential role in the federal system.
The mere existence of clear statutory language subjecting states
to suit in federal court does not ensure that federal legislators
recognized the impact of such legislation on the states. As noted
by dissenting Justice Powell in Garcia:
Federal legislation is drafted primarily by the staffs of the
congressional committees. In view of the hundreds of bills
introduced at each session of Congress and the complexity of
many of them, it is virtually impossible for even the most
conscientious legislators to be truly familiar with many of the
statutes enacted. 215
Even assuming that federal legislators are in fact intimately
familiar with the legislation upon which they vote, the represen-
tative process, absent the safeguards of substantive judicial re-
view, will not necessarily afford a result consistent with
constitutional values.2 16 The Court's deference to the majoritarian
political process misconstrues judicial review as antidemocratic
when it fails to reinforce majority rule.2 17 Majority rule is not
the end prescribed by the Constitution, however, but rather the
means, along with judicial review, to achieve constitutional goals.21s
The Constitution explicitly shields certain values from the vola-
tility of the political arena, thus requiring the judiciary to identify
those values and ensure their protection through adequate judi-
cial review.219
214. See Quern, 440 U.S. at 345. Justice Rehnquist looked to the legislative history
behind the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. S 1983, and found that "[section] 1983 does
not explicitly and by clear language indicate on its face an intent to sweep away the
immunity of the States; nor does it have a history which . . . shows that Congress
considered and firmly decided to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the
States." Quern, 448 U.S. at 345.
215. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 576 (1985) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
216. Chemerinsky, supra note 160, at 74-77.
217. Id. at 76.
218. Id. at 75-76.
219. Id. at 77.
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Certain fundamental constitutional values, such as those free-
doms encompassed in the Bill of Rights, deserve the full protec-
tion of substantive judicial review. The Court should not, however,
relegate the protection of other constitutional values, such as
eleventh amendment state immunity,220 to the whims of the
majoritarian political process. Professor Wechsler's argument
that the national political process safeguards the states' role in
our dual state-federal government 221 fails to account for the infir-
mities of that process. 22 In the past thirty years, the United
States has witnessed not only a dramatic shift in the kind of
federal regulation applicable to the states,m but also "a variety
of structural and political changes . . . [that combine] to make
Congress particularly insensitive to state and local values." 24 The
weakening of political parties on the local level, the rise of the
national media, and the adoption of the seventeenth amendment,
which provides for direct election of senators, have shifted con-
gressional attention away from state and local interests and
toward various national constituencies. 225
The legislative process- although modelled on the democratic
fiction that representative decisionmaking reflects the majority
view-is ill-suited to the preservation of a proper constitutional
balance in federal-state relations. The increasing role of the
federal government in regulating state activity, through direct
commands or the conditional granting of federal funding, and the
increasing dominance of national interests over state and local
interests in the federal legislature imply that the processes
behind the composition and selection of federal representatives
cannot sufficiently protect the states' interests.226
220. But cf. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh-Amendment, and State Sovereign
Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1 (1988) (arguing that the Court erred in granting constitutional
status to state sovereign immunity).
221. See Wechsler, supra note 18, at 558.
222. See Chemerinsky, supra note 160, at 78-81. Professor Wechsler grants undue
significance to the states' "crucial role in the selection and the composition of the national
authority:' Wechsler, supra note 18, at 546.
223. See ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, REGULATORY FED-
ERALISM: POLICY, PROCESS, IMPACT AND REFORM 1-24 (1984).
224. Id. at 50.
225. See id. at 50-51. Representatives of both Houses of Congress have developed
independent constituencies among groups that support national initiatives, such as farm-
ers, environmentalists, and the poor. Id. Other factors, such as single issue voters, a
legislator's own ideology, the influences of political parties, and reduced electoral partic-
ipation, raise doubts about the representativeness of the political process. Chemerinsky,
supra note 160, at 78-79.
226. Professor Rapaczynski compares process jurisprudence as applied to federalism
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A Strict State Consent Standard
Garcia suggests that when the national political process func-
tions smoothly without impairing the states' role in either choos-
ing national representatives or in voicing their interests to those
representatives, the Court need not interfere. 22 This concept
ignores the true extent of state participation in the political
process. States do not merely influence the selection of federal
legislators and lobby for or against pending legislation. Rather,
states choose to submit themselves to federal regulation by par-
ticipating in federally regulated activities. 22
Even though the clear statement rule would theoretically alert
Congress to the potential consequences to states of proposed
legislation, the Court should not blindly assume that Congress
considered fully the constitutional implications of overriding state
immunity.229 Instead, the Court should once more insist on state
consent as a prerequisite to suits in federal court.20 In cases
involving commerce clause legislation, a strict state consent stan-
dard would preserve state autonomy and prevent the imposition
of burdensome retrospective damage awards upon unconsenting
states.
The Court could infer state consent from either postlegislation
participation in a federally regulated activity or postlegislation
to process jurisprudence as applied to individual rights and observes that the judiciary
should
scrutinize closely an outcome of the political process that impairs the channels
of communication necessary for its own future health or discriminates against
minorities that face organizational obstacles in getting a fair share of gov-
ernmental benefits. In both these cases, as in the case of federal action
endangering the states, it would be impossible to say that, as long as the
formal requirements of representation are satisfied, the courts should stay
out of the conflict because the process did not fail. For in all such cases, the
responsible governmental authorities-designed to fulfill a great variety of
tasks and not geared to any one of them exclusively-may occasionally fail
with respect to an aspect of their constitutional mission.
Rapaczynski, supra note 160, at 395.
227. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550-54 (1985).
228. Despite the truth of Justice Brennan's statement that "the States surrendered a
portion of their sovereignty when they granted Congress the power to regulate com-
merce," Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. State Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184, 191 (1964)
(emphasis added), the retained portion of sovereignty should preserve for states some
control over their liabilities.
229. In his dissent in Garcia, Justice Powell chastised the Court for its blind faith in
Congress: "This Court has never before abdicated responsibility for assessing the consti-
tutionality of challenged action on the ground that affected parties theoretically are able
to look out for their own interests through the electoral process." Garcia, 469 U.S. at
567 n.12 (Powell, J., dissenting).
230. See Parden, 377 U.S. at 186.
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acceptance of federal fundsPl This approach would preserve a
central theme of eleventh amendment jurisprudence: "states
should have the opportunity to participate in the determination
of the burdens they will bear."'' Although the federally regulated
activity might be essential to a state's functioning, or the state's
need for the federal funds might be acute, the state would have
the option, in principle, to withdraw from the activity or refuse
funds, thus preserving its sovereign immunity.m Granting states
the power to retain immunity by refusing to participate in certain
activities recognizes the full extent of state participation in the
political process.
In Union Gas, Justice Scalia criticized Congress' ability to
condition state action on waiver of eleventh amendment immu-
nity, finding "obvious and fatal difficulties in acknowledging such
a power."'' Noting that all prospective applications of federal
prescriptions may be characterized as invitations to states to
waive their immunity, Scalia concluded that the power to regulate
states conditioned upon consent to federal jurisdiction was sub-
stantially the same as the power to override state immunity
without their consent.23 The consent standard, however, excludes
potential retroactive imposition of liabilities, which poses the
most significant threat to states' autonomy and fiscal integrity2 6
Furthermore, the consent standard recognizes "the idea of in-
formed consent as a basis of democratic legitimation."237 Con-
gressional enactments may induce states to waive their sovereign
immunity, but so long. as they do not compel unconsenting states
to appear as defendants in federal court, they will not violate
the principle of federalism.m
231. Although "mere receipt of federal funds cannot establish that a State has consented
to suit in federal court," clear statutory language that gives a state notice that the
receipt of federal funds will subject it to damage actions in federal court will render a
state's acceptance of funds under the statute a valid waiver of its immunity. Atascadero
State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 246-47 (1985).
232. Nowak, supra note 29, at 1449.
233. The Court took this approach in Parden. See Parden, 377 U.S. at 196-97. Because
"the state had voluntarily become the operator of a business for which federal regulations
created liabilities, it could not claim that it was denied a meaningful role in the deter-
mination of the burdens which it would bear." Nowak, supra note 29, at 1450.
234. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2303 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring
and dissenting).
235. Id
236. Scalia dismissed as "rare" the possibility that commerce clause legislation would
subject states to retroactive liability. Id. at 2303 n.2.
237. See Rapaczynski, supra note 160, at 365.
238. See Kaden, supra note 162, at 893-94. Justice Cardozo once suggested that achieving
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Scalia condemned the consent standard as an exaltation of form
over substance:
There is little more than a verbal distinction between saying
that Congress can make the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
liable to private parties for hazardous-waste clean-up costs on
sites that the Commonwealth owns and operates, and saying
the same thing but adding at the end "if the Commonwealth
chooses to own and operate them."2 9
The irony of this observation is that the jurisprudence of process
federalism itself permits judicial inquiry as to form, but not
substance. Federalism concerns, however, require closer judicial
scrutiny of the political process than the Court has been willing
to give to challenges of eleventh amendment state immunity.
CONCLUSION
The principle of eleventh amendment state immunity, along
with its tenth amendment state sovereignty sibling, has suffered
from the terminal malady of lack of definition. The Supreme
Court's failure to spell out adequately the breadth of state sov-
ereign immunity mandated by the "letter and spirit of the
Constitution ' 240 left the tenth and eleventh amendments open to
attack. Neither amendment survived the battle.241
The Court has retreated from Hans v. Louisiana42 in part
because the maxim that "the king can do no wrong"'243 is perceived
as unjust and incompatible with a democratic system of govern-
ment 2 44 This reasoning, however, ignores two important consid-
a federal end by inducing'a state program is a means of cooperative federalism, not
coercion. He also observed, however, that "'the location of the point at which pressure
turns into compulsion, and ceases to be inducement, [is] a question of degree,-at times,
perhaps, of fact:" Id. (quoting Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
239. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2303 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting).
240. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
241. See Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2280-86 (plurality opinion); Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 539-57 (1985).
242. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
243. See supra note 21.
244. "We the People" formed the governments of the several States. Under our
constitutional system, therefore, a State is not the sovereign of its people.
Rather, its people are sovereign. Our discomfort with sovereign immunity,
born of systems of divine right that the Framers abhorred, is thus entirely
natural. . . . For none can gainsay that a State may grievously hurt one of
its citizens. Our expanding concepts of public morality are thus offended
when a State may escape legal redress for its wrongs.
Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare,
411 U.S. 279, 322-23 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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erations: first, that even medieval Englishmen recognized "that
the king was not only capable of but disposed toward doing
wrong," which necessitated the development of procedures to
secure the king's consent to suit;245 and second, that a consent
standard promotes democratic decisionmaking in that it involves
both Congress and the states in the determination of state
liabilities.
Although the Court's decision in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
Co.246 clearly reconciled modern tenth and eleventh amendment
jurisprudence, the Court could have reserved a more meaningful
standard of review in eleventh amendment controversies without
departing from the process federalism approach advocated in
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.2 47 Instead,
the Court in Union Gas endorsed a severely restricted judicial
role, in which the Court will mechanically examine a statute's
construction to determine a state's amenability to suit in federal
court.
Even though the clear statement rule "assures [states] at least
one bite at the apple ' 8 representing protection of their interests,
it is an unsavory nibble of a bruised piece of fruit. Union Gas
relegated state immunity to "merely a default disposition that
can be altered by action of Congress."2 49 A strict state consent
standard in cases in which Congress has sought to abrogate state
immunity under the commerce clause may raise problematic
questions about the governmental-proprietary distinction that
Garcia discredited2 0 Such a standard, however, more faithfully
adheres to the principles of federalism and stare decisis than the
Court's clear statement rule. Process federalism has emerged as
the modern guardian of states' interests. In both tenth and
eleventh amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has ab-
245. Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U.
COLo. L. REV. 1, 3 (1972).
246. 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989).
247. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
248. Brown, State Sovereignty Under the Burger Court-How the Eleventh Amendment
Survived the Death of the Tenth: Some Broader Implications of Atascadero State Hospital
v. Scanlon, 74 GEO. L.J. 363, 394 (1985).
249. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2300 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting).
250. Professors Brown and Nowak both recognize that the governmental-proprietary
distinction must necessarily reappear should courts seek to determine whether a state
made a truly voluntary election to forgo eleventh amendment protection for other benefits.
Professor Brown doubts the likelihood of a resurrection of the governmental-proprietary
dichotomy, whereas Professor Nowak sees its usefulness in at least those cases in which
the Court seeks to infer congressional abrogation of state immunity. See Brown, supra
note 248, at 393-94; Nowak, supra note 29, at 1449.
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dicated responsibility for carving its rough concept into a
serviceable principle.
Victoa L. Calkns
